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I. INTRODUCTION
Changes in economic forces, federal regulatory policies and inter-
state pipelines have affected Oklahoma particularly. In 1981, for ex-
ample, Oklahoma enjoyed an average of 25.6881 drilling rigs per day
working within its boundaries and had total severance tax income at-
tributable to natural gas production of $ 281,958,490.982 on 2.0 Tcf of
produced gas.' By 1991, however, an average of only 3.741 rigs were
in operation on a daily basis. 4 Moreover, during the same ten year
period, the average price per Mcf at the wellhead fell from $1.87 to
$1.475 while the average cost of natural gas sold at the burner tip to
residential consumers increased from $2.94 to $4.72.6 The fall of well-
head prices precipitated a large number of bankruptcies, bank failures
and regulatory problems. Most industry participants dealt with these
problems on a daily basis. Additionally, contract abrogations, take or
pay claims, market out clauses, split stream sale arrangements, spot
sales, gas balancing claims and royalty and excess burden calculations
1. Telephone Interview with Mr. Larry Claxton, Statistical Analysis Manager of the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Oil and Gas Division (Feb. 4, 1994) (The record high oc-
curred in 1981 for the number of rigs operating in the state of Oklahoma. By 1984, this number
had dropped off to a daily average of 11.258 rigs in operation and by 1991, only 3.471 rigs were in
operation on a daily basis) (citing statistics from Oklahoma Corporation Commission internally
compiled unpublished report).
2. Telephone Interview with Mr. Steve Martin, Oklahoma Tax Commission (Feb. 4, 1994)
(By 1991, tax revenues from natural gas had fallen to $223,851,769.00) (statistics compiled from
producer/purchaser monthly return tax payers 300 form).
3. Telephone Interview with Larry Claxton, supra note 1. The total production within the
ten year span did not change dramatically. In fact, Oklahoma produced 2.1 Tcf in 1991, 0.1 Tcf
more than the 1981 figure.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Telephone Interview with Mr. Ken Zimmerman, Oklahoma Corporation Commission,
Public Utility Division (Feb. 4, 1994) (statistics from the Energy Administration Natural Gas
Annual Report).
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all besiege the industry. As a consequence of the foregoing problems,
both federal and state lawmakers have been active in regulating the
natural gas industry in recent years. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") has enacted six major policy initiatives since
1980.1 The most recent of these is FERC Order 636.8 Oklahoma has
responded with the Production Revenue Standards Act ("PRSA") 9
and the Natural Gas Market Sharing Act ("NGMSA"). 10 These stat-
utes represent the present culmination of a continuing effort by the
natural gas community to grapple with the myriad of issues facing
them.1
This paper will first attempt to summarize the various approaches
which Oklahoma has adopted to deal with this turmoil. The
Oklahoma efforts culminated in the enactment of Senate Bill 168 on
May 8, 1992.12 Additionally, the paper will focus on the PRSA's im-
pact on day to day operations of the natural gas industry in
Oklahoma, especially when viewed in light of FERC Order 636.
Hence, a summary of the relevant current law in Oklahoma incorpo-
rating express statutory language and the Uniform Commercial Code
will be examined. Finally, the paper will attempt to review the long
overlooked issues of reliable and accurate gas measurement systems
as used in today's natural gas industry and the PRSA's expected im-
pact on the measurement of natural gas and natural gas liquids.
7. These enactments include Order No. 380, Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain
Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum Commodity Bill Provisions, F.E.R.C. Reg. Preambles 1982-1985
30,571 (1984); Order No. 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead
Decontrol, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,665 (1985); Order No. 451, Ceiling Prices: Old Gas
Pricing Structure, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,701 (1986); Order No. 500, Regulation of
Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,761
(1987); Order No. 490, Abandonment of Sales and Purchases of Natural Gas Under Expired,
Terminated, or Modified Contracts, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 30,797 (1988); Order No. 636,
Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Trans-
portation; and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Wellhead Decontrol, III F.E.R.C.
Stats. & Regs. 30,939 (1992).
8. Order No. 636, I1 F.E.R.C. Stats. and Regs. 30,939, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (Apr. 16,
1992); Order No. 636-A, III F.E.R.C. Stats. and Regs. 30,950, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,128 (Aug. 12,
1992); Order No. 636-B, 61 F.E.R.C. 61,272, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,911 (Dec. 8, 1992).
9. 1992 Okla. Sess. Laws 190, § 1-15, amended by 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 340 § 8 (codified
at OKaA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 570.1-570.15 (West Supp. 1993)).
10. 1992 Okla. Sess. Laws 190, §§ 18-26 (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 §§ 581.1-
581.10 (WVest Supp. 1993)).
11. The PRSA and NGMSA are together commonly referred to as Senate Bill 168. Senate
Bill 168, amended by S.B. 294,1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 340; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 52, § 540 renum-
bered as § 570.10, § 540.1 repealed, §§ 541-47 renumbered as §§ 581.2, 581.5-581.10.
12. 1992 Okla. Sess. Laws 190 §§ 30-31 (Sections 1 through 3, 8, 11 through 15, and 18
through 27 became effective September 1, 1992; sections 4 through 7, 9, 10, 16, and 17 became
effective July 1, 1993).
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A. Historical Background
With the passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,13 the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), an administrative
entity vested with broad regulatory powers, replaced the old Federal
Power Commission.14 Almost immediately, the FERC set out to der-
egulate the natural gas industry. Commencing in 1984, with Order
No. 380,11 the FERC allowed local distribution companies to abrogate
"minimum bill" provisions in their contracts with interstate pipe-
lines.'6 One year later the FERC issued Order No. 43617 transforming
interstate pipeline companies from merchants to transporters of gas
by allowing all firm sale' customers the right to abrogate their con-
tracts. In effect, the pipelines now had no market in which to sell in
spite of huge contract liabilities to producers to purchase gas. Conse-
quently, producers with long term contracts to sell gas to interstate
pipelines found themselves "shut in."' 9 Despite express and implied
contractual commitments from pipelines, little or no gas was moving
pursuant to long term or "base contracts." Producers without base
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1988 & Supp. 111991); 42 U.S.C. § 7255 (1988); see also AMER.
ICAN GAS AssOCIATION, 1 REGULATION OF THE GAS INDUSTRY § 5.08[5] (1993).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171-7178 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see generally 1 ENERGY L. SERV. (Cal-
laghan) § 2.05 (1980).
15. Order No. 380, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (May 25, 1984), F.E.R.C. Reg. Preambles 1982-1985
1 30,571 (1984), reh'g denied, Order No. 380-A, F.E.R.C. Reg. Preambles 1982-1985 1 30,584
(1984), reh'g denied, Order No. 380-B, 29 F.E.R.C. 1 61,076 (1984), modified, Order No. 380-C,
F.E.R.C. Reg. Preambles 1982-1985 1 30,607 , reh'g denied, Order No. 380-D 29 F.E.R.C. [
61,332 (1984), modified, Order No. 380-E, 35 F.E.R.C. 1 61,384 (1986), reh'g denied, Order No.
380-F, 40 F.E.R.C. 1 61,190 (1987).
16. "A minimum commodity bill ensures a pipeline recovery of a certain percentage of the
fixed costs that are in the commodity component of its rates. But at the same time, it also
ensures a pipeline recovery of a certain percentage of the variable costs as well." Thus, a mini-
mum commodity bill (1) operates to recover variable costs that are not actually incurred by the
pipeline and (2) serves as a barrier to competition because a customer is not likely to purchase
gas from an alternative supplier if it is required to pay for gas it does not take from the original
supplier. 49 Fed. Reg. 22,779 (May 25, 1984). See also 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW 718 (1993).
17. Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (Oct. 18, 1985), F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 1 30,665
(1985), modified, Order No. 436-A, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. 1 30,675 (1985), modified further,
Order No. 436-B, F.E.R.C. Reg. Preambles 1982-1985 1 30,668 (1985), reh'g denied, Order No.
436-C, 34 F.E.R.C. 61,404 (1986), reh'g denied, Order No. 436-D, 34 F.E.R.C. 1 61,405 (1986),
reconsideration denied, Order No. 436-E, 34 F.E.R.C. 1 61,403 (1986).
18. A firm sales contract is a contract for the sale of gas that gives the customer the right to
demand and obligates the pipeline at all times to stand ready to deliver, a certain quantity of gas
per day, generally known in the industry as Contract Demand (q.v.) or CD. WILLIAMS & MEY.
ERS, supra note 16, at 457. See also AMERICAN GAS AssOcIATION, supra note 13, § 5.08[5].
19. "Shut in" is an industry term meaning to close down a producing well temporarily for
repair, cleaning out, building up reservoir pressure, lack of market, etc. 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 16, at 1151. See generally Philip M. Marston, Pipeline Restructuring: The Future Of
Open-Access Transportation, 12 ENERGY LJ. 53, 60-62 (1991).
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contracts and producers with non-performing base contracts conse-
quently found themselves with a pressing need for cash flow.
The smaller and financially weaker producers, some of whom
were already in bankruptcy, began to seek markets for their produc-
tion at ever lower prices in a desperate attempt to increase cash flow.
This situation resulted in a whole new alternative marketing arrange-
ment, the so called "spot market."20 In this market, producers sold for
short periods, usually one month, at low prices to brokers or end users
instead of the traditional purchasers of gas, the pipelines.2
Sophisticated producers orchestrated these sales by arranging
transportation services on pipelines for their own account. Less so-
phisticated producers used an altogether new entity in the industry,
the gas marketing company. Marketers quickly interposed themselves
between producers and end users and became adept at arranging
transportation, swap arrangements and other exchange rights on the
pipeline systems so as to move gas from the wellhead to the factory
gate.22
Producers not desiring to sell on the spot market, whether be-
cause of ongoing "take or pay"' litigation or simply through unwill-
ingness to sell at low prices, were fighting a losing battle. Under
Oklahoma law, producers could sell the entire well stream of natural
gas from a well bore even if they owned only a small fraction of the
working interest in the well.24 Producers not desiring to sell were
deemed to be maintaining their gas in the ground.
Subsequently, the FERC promulgated Order No. 4511 designed
20. See 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 16, at 1180.
21. See 1 AmRICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, supra note 13, § 8A.01.
22. In the early years of this phenomena, marketers operated in an environment of little
competition. Incredibly, they also operated in an environment where neither the producer/seller
nor the end user/buyer knew of the price difference or profit margin the marketer was making.
Not until the advent of publicized price reports were producers given an independent source of
information regarding prices.
23. 8 WILAMS & MEYERS, supra note 16, at 1232-1246. See generally J. Michael Medina,
The Take-or-Pay Wars: A Cautionary Analysis for the Future, 27 TULSA LJ. 283 (1991) (discuss-
ing producer-pipeline litigation and making recommendations for future gas purchase contracts).
24. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 541-47 (Supp. 1988); see also Wade A. Hoefling, Gas Bal-
ancing Problems In A Deregulated Market: Changes And Possible Solutions Under Oklahoma
Law, 25 TULSA LJ. 63, 79-86 (1989).
25. Ceiling Prices; Old Gas Pricing Structure, Order No. 451, F.E.R.C. Reg. Preambles
1986-1990 1 30,701 (1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (June 18, 1986), modified, Order No. 451-A,
F.E.R.C. Reg. Preambles 1 30,720 (1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 46,762 (Dec. 24, 1986), modified further,
Order No. 451-B, F.E.R.C. Reg. Preambles l 30,748 (1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 21,669 (June 9, 1987).
See also 1 AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIA"ON, supra note 13, § 8A.0114]; ROBERT A. LuETrGEN,
DRAFTING NATURAL GAS CONTRACTS AFTER ORDER 436: THE PRODUCER'S PERSPECTIVE 14,
68 (Natural Resources, Energy & Environmental Law Section Monograph Series No. 11, 1989).
1994]
5
McNamara and Miller: Oklahoma's Production Revenue Standards Act Post FERC Order 636--
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1993
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
to blend "old gas" 26 contract prices with high cost "new gas."' 7 This
order was further designed to reduce the pipeline take or pay expo-
sure. Prior to this order, "old" regulated gas was priced considerably
lower than deregulated new gas. Thus, there were very few buyers
willing to purchase the higher priced new gas when there was cheaper
old gas available.' However, some buyers were locked into take or
pay contracts with sellers of regulated new gas. These buyers were not
able to compete with the lower priced old gas. The enactment of Or-
der No. 451 permitted the price of old, regulated gas to rise to a com-
parable price in relation to new gas. 9 In theory, this order eliminated
the take or pay dilemma because pipelines could offer higher prices
for old gas in trade for contract concessions on new gas.
In 1987, FERC Order No. 50030 was issued requiring producers to
offer take or pay "credits" in exchange for access to pipeline transpor-
tation.3' "In general, this rule provides that, for each unit of gas trans-
ported, the pipelines may obtain a credit for the volumes transported
as though they were volumes purchased under pre-June 23, 1987[32 ]
take or pay contracts. 33 Order No. 500 had the further effect of al-
lowing pipelines to pass take or pay litigation costs and settlement
expenses through to their tariffs.
B. Sweetheart Gas Bill
Oklahoma's first legislative attempt to deal with the phenomena
of disparate markets was the passage of the Sweetheart Gas Bill in
26. "Old gas" or "old flowing gas" is generally natural gas that was committed or dedicated
to interstate commerce on the day before.the enactment of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA)
[Nov. 9, 1978], as well as intrastate flowing gas subject to the price ceilings for intrastate rollover
contracts under section 106(b) of the NGPA. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350, 3356-3369 (1978)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3311-20 (1978)); 51 Fed. Reg. 22169 (June 18, 1986).
27. "New gas" under Order No. 451 and the NGPA is gas priced under NGPA sections 102,
103, 105, and 108. Id.
28. See Thomas G. Johnson, Order No. 451 - Market-Based Pricing For "Old" Gas, 24
TULSA LJ. 627, 638 (1989).
29. 1A AMERICAN GAS AssoCIATION, supra note 13, § 12.11[3][g].
30. Regulation Of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 500,
F.E.R.C. Reg. Preambles 30,761 (1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (Aug. 14, 1987). See also AMERI-
cAN GAS AssOCIATrON, supra note 13, § 8A.03; LUEroEN, supra note 25, at 10-13.
31. This order stated:
In order to permit pipelines to minimize the incurrence of take-or-pay liability because
of open-access transportation under these regulations, a producer must offer to credit
gas transported by a pipeline against that pipeline's take-or-pay liability to the pro-
ducer accruing under certain pre-June 23, 1987 gas purchase contracts.
52 Fed. Reg. 30335 (Aug. 7, 1987).
32. Associated Gas Distributors v. F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding the
substance of F.E.R.C. Order No. 436). The judgment was entered on June 23, 1987.
33. 52 Fed. Reg. 30338 (Aug. 14, 1987).
[Vol. 29:639
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1983.34 That bill was specifically designed to force those producers,
generally perceived as the major oil companies, who could obtain long
term base contract arrangements in the early days of the gas bubble,"
to share those contract rights with smaller producers who did not have
the leverage or marketing clout to obtain such contracts.
The Sweetheart Gas Bill did little to change the reality faced by
producers. Those desiring not to sell at low prices saw their finan-
cially weaker cousins sell ever increasing volumes of reserves out of
the well bore. Regardless whether the non-selling producers had a gas
balancing agreement or simply fell under the Beren36 and United37 de-
cisions, the results were generally the same. Under-produced produ-
cers (non-sellers) were not balanced with over-produced producers
(sellers) until the end of the productive life of the well. Further, the
balancing was accomplished at the net realized sales price, generally
without interest. Non-sellers could, therefore, sell at low market
prices for immediate cash or wait years to receive the same amount
without interest if, of course, the over-produced owners were then still
solvent. The Sweetheart Gas Bill proved to be insufficient for the
growing needs of the industry. The Oklahoma legislature, thus, con-
tinued to address new natural gas law in an effort to resolve the prob-
lem associated with equitable balancing.
C. Senate Bill 160
As a result of split stream connections and spot market sales, the
customary and prescribed methods of distributing royalty proceeds in
Oklahoma became less effective. Traditionally, 8/8ths of production
34. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 541-47, 581.2-581.10 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
35. "The term applied to the release to the market, following partial deregulation of gas
sales, and the authorized increase in the price of regulated gas, of substantial quantities of gas
previously withheld from the market by owners anticipating deregulation. As a result, the sup-
ply of gas exceeded demand under the then existing price structure in the early 1980's [cir. 1981-
1982]." 8 WILIAMS & M'ERS, supra note 16, at 504-505.
36. Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that co-owners
of oil and gas drilling and spacing unit, who were underproduced as result of "split connection"
were entitled to immediate accounting and cash balancing between owners of interests in well,
where cause of imbalance, that is, split connection, had been eliminated and there was no imme-
diately foreseeable continued imbalancing in production because there was but one purchaser of
gas from the well).
37. United Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Premier Resources Ltd., 511 F. Supp. 127 (W.D.
Okla. 1980) (holding that the facilities necessary to receive such production in kind must actually
exist and be available before a participant in a unitized production well elects to receive its fair
share of the well's production in the form of production in kind). Id. at 131. See also Hoefling,
supra note 24, at 72-77. "Beren is more consistent with Oklahoma oil and gas law and should be
read alone as the clearest statement of Oklahoma's law on balancing problems; United Petro-
leum should be largely ignored." Id.
1994]
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was distributed on revenue disbursement decks controlled by the first
purchaser or operator. This practice insured knowledge of both the
volume of production for the relevant time and the realized sales
price. It thus enabled the first purchaser or operator to comply easily
with Oklahoma's "Blanchardizing" of the basic 1/8th royalty.38 Spot
sales by non-operating working interest owners, however, increased
during the time that FERC orders were removing incentives for pipe-
lines to provide division orders and revenue disbursement depart-
ments. The inevitable result was the demise of the traditional revenue
distribution system.
During 1983 and subsequent years, non-operating working inter-
est owners selling gas for their own account often did not recognize an
obligation to pay royalty and excess royalty burdens which attached to
their working interests. Others recognized the obligations but were
unable or unwilling to invest the accounting and division order re-
sources necessary to adequately address the problems. Even well
funded and sophisticated operators had difficulty dealing with their
obligations to royalty owners having the right to receive more than the
traditional or "Blanchardized" 1/8th royalty. While accounting de-
partments could easily determine the weighted average price for all 1/
8th royalty shares, the determination of a 3/16th or 1/4th royalty obli-
gation involved calculating both the weighted average price for the
base 1/8th plus the actual net realized price of each working interest
owner burdened by the excess royalty.
Working interest owners began to separately dispose of whatever
share of production was available on the spot market and to receive
proceeds directly from marketers and end-users. The centralized con-
trol traditionally enjoyed by the operator or first purchaser was lost.
The resulting confusion and frustration culminated in the enactment
38. In large measure, the provisions of the PRSA requiring a "pooling" of royalty proceeds
by all working interest owners in the producing unit has received most of the attention directed
to this legislation. The Oklahoma legislature addressed, for the third time, in the PRSA, the
vexatious problems created by royalty shares exceeding 1/8th of production and the Blanchard
decision. To date the industry appears to be complying.
Although commonly referred to as the "Blanchard Case," the case is cited as Shell Oil Co.
v. Corporation Commission, 389 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1964) ("[T]he owners of the one-eighth royalty
in the unitized area were entitled to share in one-eighth production from a well drilled thereon
in the proportion that their acreage bore to the entire acreage in the unit.... and it was the
responsibility of each lessee taking production from the well to account to all royalty owners in
the unit for one-eighth of the production taken by him, or one-eighth of the proceeds from the
sale of such production as the lease contracts would direct, and in the ratio that the acreage of
each royalty owner bore to the total acreage as a unit.").
[Vol. 29:639
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of Senate Bill 16039 on June 7, 1985. However, Senate Bill 160 was
immediately attacked because it focused on making the first purchaser
(or pipeline) liable for enormous royalty payments. 40 The bill also
contained serious flaws which rendered its directives impossible to im-
plement by the industry. Thus, the industry continued to labor under
an inadequate legislative framework.
D. FERC Order 636
In 1992, FERC Order No. 63641 was issued requiring pipelines to
initiate open access programs. Unlike past FERC initiatives that uti-
lized incentive programs 42 to induce pipelines to unbundle their serv-
ices, Order No. 636 required separate rates for sales, transportation
and storage.4 3 Additionally, Order No. 636 required "Straight Fixed
Variable"'  rates to take away pipeline risks and make gas sales and
transportation services more uniform for all shippers.
Effective January 1, 1993, by virtue of the Natural Gas Wellhead
Decontrol Act of 1989,45 pricing controls at the wellhead were deleted
from the Natural Gas Act and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. As
a consequence, the landscape of the natural gas business changed in
the period of January 1, 1983 to January 1, 1993, from wellhead price
39. 1985 Okla. Sess. Laws 141 (amending OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 87.1 and § 540 (West
1991)).
40. See Panhandle Eastern Pipeline v. State of Oklahoma ex. rel. Commissioners of the
Land Office No. 85-2659-P (W.D. Okla. 1985) (unpublished opinion).
41. Order No. 636, III F.E.R.C. Stats. and Regs. 30,939 (1992), 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (Apr.
16, 1992); Order No. 636-A, m F.E.R.C. Stats. and Regs. 30,950 (1992), 67 Fed. Reg. 36,128
(Aug. 12, 1992); Order No. 636-B, 61 F.E.R.C. 61,272 (1992), 57 Fed. Reg. 57,911 (Dec. 8, 1992).
See generally AMERiCAN GAS AssociAaO N, supra note 13, at § 8B.
42. F.E.R.C. Order Nos. 436 and 500 both involved incentive programs to induce pipelines
to go "open-access." The F.E.R.C. allowed a streamlined certificate program if the pipelines
agreed to followed the initiative set forth within F.E.R.C. Order No. 436 and 500. The most
important of these initiatives was the prevention of pipelines to refuse service to third-party gas
purchased from a producer other than the pipeline. Before these F.E.R.C. Orders, pipelines
would rather sell their own gas. Such discrimination allowed pipelines to charge a higher price
for natural gas. By inducing pipelines to go "open-access," the price of natural gas, in theory,
would decrease.
43. There are ten major provisions within Order No. 636: 1) unbundling, 2) blanket sales
certificates, 3) no-notice transportation service, 4) equality of service, 5) open-access storage, 6)
capacity release, 7) Straight Fixed Variable (SFV) rate design, 8) pre-granted abandonment, 9)
industry costs, 10) implementation process. For a brief overview of these areas, see Thomas F.
Berg, Stop The presses! Order 636 Finally Issued, 129 PuB. UnL. FoRT. 93, 93-95 (1992).
44. There are two charges: 1) fixed charges are recovered from the reservation charge, the
price paid to assure producers they will have space on the pipeline; these rates reflect the pipe-
lines cost of basic personnel, maintenance and rate of return; and 2) usage charges are recovered
from each unit of gas transported through the pipeline, this price reflects the variable costs.
Thus, if all fixed costs are to be recovered in the reservation charge, the pipeline will be at less
financial risk.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. IV 1992).
1994]
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regulation and pipelines-as-merchants to no wellhead price constraints
and pipelines as mere transporters-of-gas.46 During this same period,
Oklahoma adopted the Sweetheart Gas Bill 47 and Senate Bill 16048 in
an attempt to maintain some degree of control over production re-
porting and royalty payments. By the enactment of Senate Bill 168,
Oklahoma adopted for the first time a regulatory scheme consistent
with the evolving natural gas industry which exists today.
II. SENATE BILL 168
In May of 1992, Oklahoma enacted the Production Revenue
Standards Act ("PRSA") and the Natural Gas Market Sharing Act
("NGMSA"). 49 This paper does not deal directly with the NGMSA,
which supersedes the Sweetheart Gas Bill and "allows a producer
without a gas purchase contract covering its interest in a well to 'elect'
to have the 'designated marketer' of the well market its share of the
gas."5 0
A. Production Revenue Standards Act
Senate Bill 168 represents the first attempt the Oklahoma legisla-
ture has made to address some of the newer problems associated with
the natural gas industry. Prior to its enactment, little statutory author-
ity existed addressing multiple working interest owners marketing, or
attempting to market, natural gas from the same wellbore. The only
previous attempt, the Sweetheart Gas Bill, proved ineffective and did
not address the logistics of how owners coordinate their taking of gas.
Working interest owners who had marketing arrangements with
marketers having unique transportation rights, or interstate pipelines,
could sell (or move) large quantities of natural gas from the wellbore.
This ability had the corresponding effect of temporarily delaying the
46. Id. See also MICHAEL D. PALMER, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN NATURAL GAS GATH-RINo
2-3 (Apr. 14, 1993) (on file with the ABA Natural Gas Marketing And Transportation Commit-
tee, Section Of Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Law And The Mineral Law Sec-
tion Of The TIsa County Bar Association).
47. OK. A. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 541-547, 570.1-570.15 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
48. See supra note 39.
49. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 581.1-581.10. (West Supp. 1993). The provisions of the
NGMSA became effective on January 1, 1993, and those of the PRSA on September 1, 1992.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 581.1-581.10 (West Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570
(West Supp. 1992).
50. Wade A. Hoefling, Oklahoma's New Natural Gas Market Sharing Act, 63 OKLA. BJ.
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other working interest owners' gas sales.51 Relatedly, these marketing
arrangements lessened the operator's control over the flow of gas
from the well. In most cases, the pipelines timely informed the opera-
tor of the timing and quantity of takes for each working interest
owner. Occasionally, however, gas was taken without the knowledge
of the operator, or contrary to the operators intentions.
These situations have caused confusion amongst operators and
pipelines as to reporting requirements of gas takes from the well.
They have also caused friction amongst working interest owners
whose marketers do not all enjoy firm non-interruptable sales ar-
rangements.52 In some cases, producers have not had all their nomi-
nated volumes actually delivered. Problems have also been
encountered when operators failed to recognize nominations from
working interest owners for available gas, or where the pipelines dis-
covered that more gas was delivered than anticipated. These imbal-
ances53  occur for numerous reasons, including "errant
communications regarding nominations, production limitations, trans-
portation capacity constraints, differences in allocation methodology
as well as differences between timely communicated and confirmed
nominations and the physical flow of gas that actually occurs., 5 4
Following FERC Order 436, and largely on its own initiative, the
51. The resulting gas balancing problems between working interest owners have been the
subject of numerous articles. See Hoefling, supra note 24, at 79-86; Edel F. Blanks, et al., A
Primer On Gas Balancing, 37 Loy L. REv. 831 (1992).
52. These firm non-interruptable arrangements provide continuous service without curtail-
ment, except under occasional, extraordinary circumstances. See 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 16, at 457.
53. "For purposes of the Production Revenue Standards Act, a well is out of balance when
cumulative gas sales on a volumetric basis for the account of all owners in a well have not been
in proportion to the respective net revenue of each owner." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52., § 570.7A
(West Supp. 1993).
In a well wherein the cumulative gas production accounts of royalty interests owners
are out of balance, producing owners in that well may agree to have the distribution of
gas royalty proceeds among the royalty interest owners made in a manner other than
according to their proportionate royalty shares. [However, this allowance to so agree is
only true if] 1) such variance shall only be permitted to the extent required to balance
the cumulative gas production accounts of the royalty interest owners; and 2) prior
notice thereof is given to the royalty interest owners affected thereby, and to the opera-
tor along with any ongoing information necessary for the operator to discharge its
duties.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.7B (West Supp. 1993).
54. COUNCIL OF PETROLEUM AccotmrANTs SoclrIEs (COPAS), JOINT TASK FORCE
GUIDELINES ON NATURAL GAS ADmiNisrRATrVE ISSUES, Bulletin No. 28, p. 54 (1990). [herein-
after COPAS]
Imbalances evolve under three types of scenarios:
(1) (producer/producer) when one or more producers sell or utilize a quantity of natural
gas in excess of their gross working interest;
11
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industry developed a system of nominating, confirming and reporting
natural gas sales from wells. These procedures attempt to minimize
imbalance problems by structuring the communication which sur-
rounds the gas sales transaction. 5 The PRSA represents Oklahoma's
first legislative attempt at codifying these practices.
B. The Mechanics Of Information Flow
Section Eight Part B57 of the PRSA identifies the required infor-
mation to be exchanged prior to the actual month of production
(hereafter referred to as the flow month). Each working interest
owner desiring to sell gas for the ensuing month nominates gas for the
flow month by giving the operator no less than five days notice of (1)
his first purchaser or shipper and (2) the volumes of gas desired to be
sold that month.5 8 Thereafter, "the owner of the gas meter shall con-
firm all nominations with the operator of the well no later than the
last business day prior to the month in which production occurs. '59
Implicit .in section 570.8B is the concept of operator allocation of
nominated volumes on the basis of a party's working interest owner-
ship in the subject well and the subject well's producing capabilities. 60
Generally, the operator must control the nomination process for the
common good. Prior to section 570.8B, it was not necessarily the
practice in Oklahoma for the operator to disallow nominations of gas
from working interest owners who were overproduced vis-a-vis their
co-owners. Operators refrained from disallowing especially when the
(2) (transporter/transporter) when a transporter receives a quantity of natural gas and rede-
livers a larger or smaller quantity of natural gas under the terms of the transportation agree-
ment; and
(3) (producer/transporter) when a producer delivers a quantity of natural gas that is larger
or smaller than the quantity of natural gas that the transporter redelivers for the producer's
account to another party. This article is only concerned with the last two scenarios. Id. at 105.
See also id. at 58-68. This article is not concerned with imbalances between competing interest
owners of a commonly held well. For an excellent discussion of such imbalances, see Hoefling,
supra note 24.
55. See COPAS, supra note 54.
56. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 570.1-570.15 (West Supp. 1992).
57. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8 (West Supp. 1992), as amended, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws
340, § 2B (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8B (West Supp. 1993)).
58. Id. § 570.8B.
59. Id.
60. Ideally, the sum of all nominations would not be more or less than the well's total capa-
ble production as limited by proration allowables for the flow month. For example, if the well is
owned 25 percent each by four working interest owners and the well's allowable productive
capability is 40,000 Mcflmonth, each owner could, and should, nominate and receive 10,000 Mcf
for the production (or flow) month.
12
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parties had subjected themselves to a written gas balancing agree-
ment.61 In most cases gas balancing agreements provide contractual
rights to underproduced parties to make up volumes to the detriment
of overproduced parties, thus relieving the operator of the responsibil-
ity for overproduction by a particular owner. This practice has some-
times spilled over to situations where no written gas balancing
agreement exists. In these cases, the operator attempts to exercise its
implied powers to regulate production.6'
Unfortunately, various operational problems may develop
notwithstanding the operator's good intentions at matching nomi-
nated volumes with expected and probable production. One example
is where a well is not producing as expected due to mechanical
problems, pipeline pressure fluctuations or operator miscalculations.63
The PRSA does not spell out the remedies available in any of these
64scenarios. Consequently, if four owners nominated and confirmed
40,000 Mcf in a given month and the subject well only produces 30,000
Mcf for that month, each working interest owner may have to ratably
take a reduced payment (7,500 vs. 10,000 Mcf). Alternatively, the first
three working interest owners could be deemed to have sold all their
nominated volumes leaving the unfortunate fourth owner
underproduced.
Conversely, the well could in actuality produce 50,000 Mcf for the
subject month. Here the extra 10,000 Mcf is commonly referred to as
U-Gas or unauthorized gas.65 Pipelines are entitled under their tariff
by FERC to impose penalties for the delivery of unauthorized gas into
their systems.66 The operator's duty to contest these penalties, allo-
cate them among the working interest owners, or to bear them itself is
far from clear.
The owner of the gas meter has twenty days after the end of the
production month to provide, in writing, to the operator of the well,
61. COPAS, supra note 54, at 54 (sample of a gas balancing agreement generally attached as
an exhibit to the joint operating agreement).
62. The operator's duty to police the conduct of unit operators appears to be implied in
both Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) and Teel v. Public Service
Company of Oklahoma, 767 P.2d 391 (Okla. 1985) (as amended on grant of rehearing on July 14,
1987).
63. COPAS, supra note 54, at 54.
64. See discussion infra section V.
65. The amount of gas transported in excess of the previously confirmed nominations for a
particular month. See also 8 WLLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 16, at 858 (defining the similar
concept of "overproduction").
66. See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 65 F.E.R.C. 61,392 (1993); Northern Gas Co., 50
F.E.R.C. 1 61,256 (1990); Transwestern Pipeline Co., 58 F.E.R.C. 61,067 (1992).
1994]
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the gross volume of gas measured by the meter both in Mcf and Btu
equivalent and value allocations between first purchaser (shippers)
and contracted producing owners.67 The first purchaser or shipper of
gas has thirty-five days following the month of production to issue a
volume allocation statement showing the volume of gas purchased
from a shipper for each contracted producing owner.68 The owner of
the meter must allocate actual production within twenty days follow-
ing the production month. Fifteen days later the purchaser makes es-
sentially the same exercise.69  Differences between the two
measurements reveal measurement errors or miscalculations occur-
ring in the nomination process.70 Unfortunately, the resolution of
these issues is not addressed by the PRSA.
However, it is possible that retroactive adjustments may relate
back months and possibly even years.71 Retroactive gas volume ad-
justments must be reported to the operator within 30 days after re-
ceiving notice of same.72 Many existing sales contracts provide for
audit rights of meter records for as long as three years. UCC princi-
ples73 have been extended to natural gas sales for at least five year
periods74 and new title 52, § 547(A) provides for a five year statute of
limitations under S.B. 168.75
The operator may impose a specified zero nomination penalty
upon any producer whose gas meter owner, first purchaser or gas
shipper fails to provide the information required under subsection D
or E.76 This penalty sanctions a non-reporting producer by permitting
the operator of the well to confirm zero volume of gas sales for that
noncomplying producing owner.77 The rights of producing non-opera-
tors are less clear in the event it is the operator who fails to provide
67. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8D (West Supp. 1992), amended by, 1993 Okla. Sess.
Laws 340 (codified at OKLA. STAT. AnN. tit. 52, § 570.8D (West Supp. 1993)).
68. Id. § 570.8E.
69. Id. §§ 570.8D, E.
70. COPAS, supra note 54, at 54.
71. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8D (West Supp. 1993).
72. Id.
73. See discussion infra section V(A).
74. See United Crude Marketing & Transportation Co. v. Robert Gordon Oil Co., 831 P.2d
659, 661-62 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992) (holding five year statute of limitations applied to an oil con-
tract governed under U.C.C.).
75. 1992 Okla. Sess. Laws 190, § 26 (codified at OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 581.10 (West
Supp. 1993).
76. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws 340 (codified at OKrA STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8F, H (West
Supp. 1993).
77. See discussion infra section V(B).
[Vol. 29:639
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the information or, more importantly, provides inaccurate or incom-
plete information. Also left silent are the remedies available to the
operator and other working interest owners in the event of negligence
or willful misconduct on the part of the owner of the gas meter, first
purchaser or shipper. Subsection J, as recently amended, simply states
that "[t]he remedies provided for in this section shall not preclude any
party from pursuing the remedies available to it through the district
courts, as provided by existing law, including the right to offset. '' 78
C. OCC Rulemaking Proceedings
In 1993, the Oklahoma legislature passed Senate Bill 294,79
amending section 570.8 of Title 52. Also contained in that legislation
was a directive compelling the Oklahoma Corporation Commission to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the PRSA. The Com-
mission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on August 16,
1993.80 After a comment period and public hearings, the Commission
issued Order No. 381632 on March 30, 1994, adopting certain of the
proposed rules subject to legislative and gubernatorial approval.81 As
of the time of this publication, the proposed rules have not been fully
implemented. 2
III. GAS MEASUREMENT
Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of the PRSA is its incorpora-
tion of a standard measurement reference. 3 Prior to this enactment,
Oklahoma law directed the reporting of volumes and MMBtu's with-
out reference to any statutory authority.84 Natural gas measurement,
however, is perhaps one of the most complicated areas in the industry
due to its combination of a multitude of scientific disciplines, legal
concepts and accounting practices. Clearly, compliance with the
PRSA cannot be accomplished without accurate and reliable mea-
surement data.
78. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8J.
79. See supra note 76.
80. Cause No. RM-930-0000085.
81. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 251-56 (West 1987).
82. E.g., Proposed Rule 165: 10-27-5 relates to pre-sale nominations.
83. OKaA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 474 (West 1992) (as cited in OMuA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 570.12(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993)).
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A. Oklahoma Gas Measurement Law
The Oklahoma Gas Measurement Law 5 directs the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission to "determine the average temperature of
gas, as produced in each oil and gas field in Oklahoma .... 86 To date,
however, no reported cases have dealt with this statute, and its direc-
tives have not, to the authors' knowledge, been followed. Sadly, the
current Oklahoma Gas Measurement Law is silent with respect to
measuring the heating value of natural gas. As almost all contracts
are now expressed in MMBtu's, this silence is a significant flaw in the
PRSA.
Also troubling is section 472's directive to look to the "methods
and tables generally recognized by and commonly used in the natural
gas industry." In this regard, what is commonly referred to as AGA
Report No. 387 describes proper engineering technique for correct gas
85. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 471-77 (West 1991).
Section 474 states as follows:
Each and every sale, and each and every purchase, delivery and receipt of gas by vol-
ume hereafter made in this state by, for or on behalf of an oil and gas lease owner,
royalty owner thereunder, or other mineral interest owner, shall be made and such gas
shall be measured, calculated, purchased, delivered and accounted for on the basis of
"a standard cubic foot of gas" as defined in [Section 472], and as determined under this
act [Section 471-74]. Whenever the provisions of this act operate to change the basis of
measurement provided for in existing contracts, then the price for gas, including royalty
gas, provided for in such contracts shall, if either the purchaser or seller so desires, be
adjusted to compensate for the change in the method of measuring the volume of gas
delivered thereunder. This provision is intended to protect parties to contracts now in
existence, so that after this act becomes effective the total amount of money paid for a
volume of gas purchased, or required to be accounted for, under existing contracts shall
remain unaffected by this act. Nothing in this section shall affect or apply to purchases
or sales made on any basis other than volume basis.
OicLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 474 (West 1991). Section 472 further states as follows:
The term "cubic foot of gas" or "standard cubic foot of gas" means the volume of gas,
including both natural gas and casinghead gas, contained in one (1) cubic foot of space
at a standard pressure base and at standard temperature base. The standard pressure
base shall be fourteen and sixty-five hundredths (14.65) pounds per square inch abso-
lute and the standard temperature base shall be sixty degrees Fahrenheit (60F). When-
ever the conditions of pressure and temperature differ from the above standard,
conversion of the volume from these conditions to the standard conditions shall be
made in accordance with the Ideal Gas Laws corrected for deviation from Boyle's Law,
which correction must be made unless the pressure at the point of measurement is two
hundred (200) pounds per square inch gauge or less; all in accordance with methods
and tables generally recognized by and commonly used in the natural gas industry.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 472 (West 1991).
86. Id. § 473.
87. ORIFICE METERING OF NATURAL GAS AND OTHER RELATED HYDROCARBON FLUIDS,
Report No. 3 (AMERICAN GAS AssOCIATION, et al. eds., 3d ed., Nov. 1992). The report de-
scribes proper engineering techniques for correct gas measurement.
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measurement. Although this report should be of some use, it is ques-
tionable whether the industry is in strict compliance with its provi-
sions.38 Daily readings of gas are required to be made;8 9 however,
electronic flow measurement devices may not comply.
Complicating this picture is the fact that the FERC has author-
ized and sanctioned measurement standards for pipelines falling
under its jurisdiction. Further, many contracts for the purchase and
sale of natural gas contain specific contractual language regarding
measurement. Certain transportation and exchange agreements be-
tween pipelines and their shippers also contain measurement provi-
sions. As a consequence, measurement standards may vary and be
governed by contract, state law, pipeline tariffs, or a combination of
all three. Thus, a careful review of jurisdictional and contractual
rights is necessary before embarking on mismeasurement claims. In
some cases, the contractual language, and thus measurement stan-
dards, may conflict between the wellhead meter, the pipeline intercon-
nect meter and the ultimate sales meter of the end-user.
B. Gas Measurement Technology
Mechanical and human errors are common due to the imprecise
nature of volume calculating equipment.90 As the following chart
88. In addition, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission has adopted certain rules gov-
erning the measurement of natural gas, including the Oklahoma Gas Measurement Law in its
entirety. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 471-474 (West 1991); OKLAHOMA ADMINIsTRATIVE
CODE (OAC), 165:10-17-4 (1992). OAC 165: 10-17-5(a)(1) requires a gas meter and a recorder
for every producing gas well in Oklahoma. Ironically, electronic flow measurement meters, now
utilized by most pipelines, do not have a recorder. Id.
89. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 30 (West 1991); see discussion infra section III(B).
90. Dean C. Maschoff & Terry G. Palmberg, Gas Imbalances: A Growing Problem, 124
PUB. Unt.. FORT. 24, 25 (1989). Some of the factors contributing to physical gas imbalances are:
1. Measurement error. Measurement errors are caused by either instrument error or
human error. Some common errors are:
a. Wrong coefficient actual inside diameter (AID) for orifice meter
b. Wrong plate size
c. Plate backward
d. Plate not centered or not down all the way
e. Meter not in calibration
f. Incorrect spring range on record
g. Chart not inked
h. Painted chart causing square root error
i. "Iype of connection (flange/pipe) error
j. Charts late and closing with estimates
k. Charts dated wrong
1. Clock slow or fast
m. Buckled plate
n. Chart left in service on a meter run with blind plate
o. Meter left out of service
p. Wrong specific gravity applied
17
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shows, the results of errors in the gas measurement process by orifice
meters can be significant:91
Gremlin Cause
6-in plate bowed down-
stream 1/4 in
Upstream solids or liquids
resting against plate (same
condition with wrong-





Dull plate-looks sharp but
won't pare finger nail
Nicks
Leaky seal ring around
plate, but ring continuous
Discontinuous or cut out
seal ring
An orifice plate stamped 4
x 1.000 in but actually
bored 1/32 in oversize
Upstream freeze-up bowed
by gas pressure or ice slug
Accumulation of mud, water






Deteriorated rubber, 0 ring,
or cut edges



















2. Line Pack- Line pack is the amount of gas contained within the pipeline at anytime
that is physically needed to allow the pipeline to operate....
3. Unknown leaks: Unmeasured gas leaks through the distribution company's line,
gas lines run by small towns, old valves, etc.
4. Gas vented by instrument. Certain instruments (especially pneumatic controllers)
vent gas continually. This [venting] may be necessary in order for the instrument to
operate.
5. Blowdown: Sometimes incidental amounts of gas are blown down (and not esti-
mated), as necessitated by daily operation. Changing of the orifice plate may require
blowing down the upper chamber of a fitting or a meter tube without a dual-chamber
fitting. Compliance-type inspection of a regulator may require blowdown. A major
blowdown of a section of pipeline for construction or caused by third party damage is
usually estimated.
6. Liquid fallout. Some hydrocarbons and water vapor may drop out under certain
conditions or temperature and pressure. This liquid is equivalent to the gaseous vol-
ume that is not accounted for. Water, carbon dioxide, and hydrocarbon knockout at a
conditioning, treating, or processing plant should be properly accounted for.
7. Measuring the same gas more than once can contribute to accounting error.
8. Wrong factors or dimensions on record (schedule 40 vs. schedule 80).
9. Wrong cycle on record for a positive displacement or turbine meter [1000 (1M)
instead of 10,000 (1OM)].
10. Index read and recorded wrong on positive displacement or turbine meter.
LoIrr DATrA-BARUA, NATURAL GAS MEASUREMENT & CONTROL 62-63 (1992).
91. Id. at 54.
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As a result, most sales and purchase contracts at the producer level
and most pipeline tariffs contain 1 percent to 2 percent margins where
mismeasurement is tolerated. It can thus be said that gas mismeasure-
ment is, to a degree, an accepted reality within the industry.
The most important physical devices necessary to measure gas
with an orifice meter92 are the meter tube, orifice plate, measure taps
and the differential pressure gauge.93 The meter tube and the orifice
plate are the segments most likely to cause measurement difficulties.94
As gas flows through the meter tube, the orifice plate causes a flow
restriction which is subsequently recorded as a drop in line pressure.95
The recording of the orifice plate's dimensions is crucial for a reliable
restriction calculation. If the wrong plate size is recorded the amount
of gas measured will be inaccurate.96
This precise situation occurred in Woods Petroleum v. Delhi Gas
Pipeline.7 The contract between the two parties in Woods Petroleum
stipulated that the pipeline was responsible for accounting the gas vol-
ume transferred through the line.98 According to their records, a 1.25
inch orifice plate was used to measure the differential gas pressure.99
However, Woods Petroleum identified a sudden jump in production
that differed greatly from the previously recorded data.100 Delhi Gas
Pipeline explained the difference from one day to the next by conclud-
ing that "something must have happened in the well to cause an actual
increase."'' 1 Alternatively, Woods Petroleum concluded that the dif-
ferential in line pressure was a result of using the wrong orifice
plate.'0" Woods Petroleum so concluded after conducting a series of
92. T. Dean Graves, Natural Gas Measurement, 38 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 418 (1989). The
other three types of devices used to measure gas are: 1) positive displacement meters - typical of
the household meter, 2) turbine meters, and 3) rotary meters. For the purposes of this article,
only the orifice meter needs to be addressed due to the fact that it is the most widely used in the
industry. Id. at 419.
93. Lorr DATrA-BARUA, NATURAL GAS MEASUREMENT & CONTMOL 5 (1992).
94. Graves, supra note 92, at 418-19.
95. Id.
96. See Woods Petroleum v. Delhi Gas Pipeline, 700 P.2d 1023 (Okla. Ct. App. 1083);
Graves, supra note 92, at 419.
97. Woods Petroleum, 700 P.2d at 1023. Plaintiff was able to recover for defendant pipe-
line's negligence in measuring gas pursuant to a contract where the evidence demonstrated that
defendant's actions in putting wrong size orifice plate in gas line, in neglecting to check size of
device, and in suppressing the fact that the wrong plate had been in place were of such a nature
as to give rise to an inference that those actions had been taken recklessly and in wanton disre-
gard of plaintiff's rights.
98. Id. at 1025.
99. ild.
100. Id. at 1025-26.
101. Id. at 1026.
102. Id. at 1025.
1994]
19
McNamara and Miller: Oklahoma's Production Revenue Standards Act Post FERC Order 636--
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1993
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:639
calculations using different size orifice plates. While the pipeline
claimed to use a 1.25 inch plate, Woods Petroleum's calculations coin-
cided unequivocally with a 1.75 inch plate. °3 Utilizing the theory of
res ipsa loquitur,104 Woods Petroleum successfully pled their negli-
gence action. The jury did not award punitive damages, but the court
recognized that such a remedy was available. °5
While calculating the differential pressure is a potential cause of
error, it is merely one of many variables involved in gas mismeasure-
ment. °6 Many other elements, such as the pipeline pressure and tem-
perature, affect the final calculations.10 7 In sum, "[t]he physical
attributes of natural gas result in measurement that is not precise." 08
Traditionally, the differential pressure during the production of
natural gas is continuously recorded on a circular "chart." 10 9 How-
ever, there are numerous factors not recorded on the chart that also
influence the final results. The meter tube must be of a certain length
and quality so as to allow gas to flow properly, while the orifice plate
must be very sharp and clean to enable a clear recording. 110 In all,
there are at least twenty-four items that need to be integrated into the
formula in order to calculate an accurate volumetric reading."' If
103. Id. at 1025-26.
104. Id. at 1026.
105. Id. at 1028; see discussion infra section V(B) concerning consequences of filing in con-
tract or in tort, and the possibility of punitive damages.
106. Graves, supra note 92, at 420-21.
Several steps must be followed before volumes can be available for accounting's use.
The measuring equipment must be installed and maintained. Charts must be put on the
meter on a regular basis, such as 24 hour, 7 day or 8 day charts. Once the charts are
removed, they must be examined by field personnel to make sure proper information is
listed and the recording is correct. The charts are then sent to the integration depart-
ment to determine the average differential and pressure which are the two main infor-
mation items needed for volume calculation. A machine called the integrator is used to
determine the average differential and pressure. Once these charts are integrated, they
are also analyzed to insure that the information provided is correct after verification of
the information, the information from both the integrator and the field is entered in the
computer and the volumes are calculated. Upon completion of the calculation, it needs
to be verified to make sure mistakes did not occur.
Id. at 426.
107. According to Mr. Graves:
[A] problem of measurement which continues to prevent gas measurement from being
an exact science, is that the factors used are not without tolerances or variances. If two
meters are connected in a line measuring the same gas, they will not record exactly the
same volume. The volumes may be close but they will very seldom be exactly the same.
This difference is due to the factor limitations and the difficulty in obtaining the most
accurate and complete information.
Graves, supra note 92, at 421-22.
108. COPAS, supra note 54, at 6.
109. Graves, supra note 92, at 420-21.
110. Id. at 419-21.
111. Id. at 421.
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even one of the twenty-four items deviates or is not available, the en-
tire volumetric calculation will be faulty." 2 While the deviation might
only equal a percentage point, this error can amount to a significant
economic loss due to the shear volume being transported through the
pipeline." 3
Periodically, charts are replaced by field personnel who forward
the completed chart to the pipeline or operator for integration. At
this time, the in-house measurement department of most pipelines
read the chart by comparing the differential and static pressures and
by the use of formulas set forth in AGA Report No. 3, which calculate
the volume of gas produced." 4 The volumes are then multiplied by
the MMBtu factor which normally has been separately calculated or
estimated by chromatography equipment." 5 This data is then for-
warded to the accounting department where the sales price, revenue
distribution and severance tax is computed.
A draw back to this traditional method of calculating gas volumes
is the timing issues presented by the PRSA and the modem natural
gas industry. Often, charts cannot be delivered, integrated and the
data reported to the accounting department within the 20 days follow-
ing the end of the production month as required." 6 Further, the tradi-
tional orifice chart meter does not provide the operator, the purchaser
or the seller with what has come to be called "real time data."" 7 Pro-
duction data is instead dependent upon physically retrieving and inte-
grating the chart." 8 In most cases such data is derived too late for
corrective action to be taken." 9
In the modem gas industry, multiple co-owners in a single well
may market and sell their proportionate share of gas through a single
112. Id. at 420-21.
113. For example, there can be a $4,000 loss if mismeasurement occurs where each Mcf is
worth $2.00 and 2 million Mcf are produced.
114. Supra note 87.
115. As noted earlier, see discussion supra section III(A), Oklahoma law does not currently
address the measurement of the heating value of natural gas although its reporting to interest
owners is mandated by OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 52, § 570.12(A)(4) (West Supp. 1993).
116. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8D (West Supp. 1993). Due to the many steps
involved in calculating volume, there is a significant delay in providing volume statements.
Graves, supra note 92, at 427.
117. "Real time data" is the ability to receive volume allocation statements contemporane-
ously with the actual flow of gas. Unfortunately, an orifice meter is not capable of instantaneous
calculations because of the physical nature of natural gas.
118. Maschoff & Palmberg, supra note 90, at 25.
119. In accordance with section 570.8B, volume allocation statements must be received five
days before the producing owner is required to nominate for the following month or else the
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meter.120 The nomination process ideally will allocate between the co-
owners all the available production of the gas well for the ensuing
month. Sometimes this allocation is amongst more than one pur-
chaser. Without real time data, however, the operator is temporarily
ignorant of the difference between nominated volumes and volumes
actually being produced.
Traditional mechanical orifice meters provide little control for the
prudent operator striving to ensure that his wells' actual production
equals its nominated volumes. The reality in Oklahoma, however, is
that traditional orifice measurement remains the most financially via-
ble method for measuring gas. As a consequence, the PRSA has and
will continue to put great pressure on chart integrators and operators.
As noted previously, the purchaser or shipper must make a vol-
ume allocation statement within 35 days. Given the thousands of
wells on any pipeline or gathering system, pipelines, who traditionally
own the meter, were hard pressed to measure volumes and process
data in such a short period of time. 121 Thus, in the mid 1980's, most
pipelines began the conversion process from mechanical orifice me-
ters to electronic flow meters.
Electronic flow meters provide "fully automated billing, alloca-
tion and nomination processes. ' )1 22 The data generated by the elec-
tronic flow meter can be transmitted by telephone lines, cellular
phones or other modes directly into a host computer which can gener-
ate transportation invoices, settlement statements and supporting de-
tail without the necessity of human input. Today's existing technology
allows pipeline owners to have real time knowledge of the quantity of
gas entering the system from thousands of receipt points and real time
awareness of the amount of gas leaving the system at multiple delivery
points. Without this technology, implementation of the PRSA would
be impossible.
While electronic flow measurement is vastly faster than tradi-
tional flow measurement devices, it is not inherently more accurate.
In fact, most, if not all electronic devices are essentially built around
the standard orifice meter. These devices simply "convert the physical
variables to electrical signals instead of chart recordings.9'2
120. Section 570.9(A) incorporates this concept.
121. Maschoff & Palmberg, supra note 90, at 25.
122. DArA-BARuA, supra note 93, at 122.
123. Id. at 72.
[Vol. 29:639
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As with the traditional chart based meters, electronic flow mea-
surement requires data to be imputed for the system to measure gas
flow accurately. Differential pressure, static pressure and tempera-
ture are the most critical measurements.124 Additionally, Btu content,
specific gravity, H20 and nitrogen content need to be fed into the
electronic computation. Perhaps most important to the producer/
seller is the receiving pipelines' line pressure. Thus, while electronic
flow measurement devices are an absolute necessity in today's natural
gas environment, they cannot insure, as many assume, an error free
measurement of natural gas.
Producers and marketers, both of whom are subject to penalties
in the post-FERC Order 636 environment are heavily dependent on
the electronic measurement system of the pipeline. For this reason,
many operators continue to use a sales meter with a chart to enable
the operator to compare volume statements and to have some physi-
cal evidence in the event of litigation or an audit. Also, many opera-
tors have engaged independent auditors to audit the electronic flow
meter systems. Unfortunately, audits of electronic flow devices are
inherently difficult because, without charts, there is no physical record
of the actual "flow" transaction by day, week or month. While each
system's program printout shows the current variable input data, no
evidence is available to show the input data used by the meter owner
at the time of production. Given Oklahoma's lone case of Woods Pe-
troleum v. Delhi Gas Pipeline,-5 the future of gas measurement litiga-
tion in Oklahoma appears certain to be tested under the regulatory
system which the PRSA has imposed.
IV. POST WELLHEAD ALLOCATION METHODOLOGY
While the majority of articles on natural gas imbalances focus on
the issues which exist between working interest owners within the
same gas well, other gas imbalance issues exist between shippers,
transporters, marketers and pipelines after the gas has left the well-
head. To the extent a buyer (being a marketer or end-user) receives
more gas than confirmed nominations indicated before the flow
month, other buyers or transporters by necessity received less. The
PRSA does not address these problems. Instead, these issues are left
to the industry to resolve or are governed by the tariffs of individual
pipelines.
124. Id. at 125.
125. See supra note 96.
1994]
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In the majority of cases, end-users are, in theory, delivered the
volume of gas they contracted for by the pipeline. Thus, if the mar-
keter who contracted with the end-user fails to" aggregate the needed
volumes, the pipeline informs the marketer that it was short. In es-
sence, this system implies that the transporter "cover" for the mar-
keter. In some cases, however, the pipeline must balance the total
volume of gas confirmed into its system with the total volume of gas
delivered off its system. The Council of Petroleum Accountants Soci-
eties (COPAS) has identified five (5) different types of allocation
methods, 26 which address these balancing issues.
A. Prorata Allocation Based on Confirmed Nominations
Under this arrangement, all shippers' 12 7 will receive a prorata
share of any over or underproduced gas that has been transported
through the system, regardless of imbalance causation.12 The princi-
pal benefit of this method is that the risk is spread equally among all
shippers privy to the transaction. Additionally, "[t]he operator and
transporter involved here have the data necessary to perform simulta-
neous allocation as soon as measured quantities are available" be-
cause they possess the record of confirmations from the production
month.12 9 Such timely imbalance reporting creates a more efficient
system.
Nonetheless, this allocation method is not without its disadvan-
tages. While small imbalances produce negligible losses that shippers
hardly notice, large imbalances could be highly inequitable, resulting
in one party being penalized for the noncompliance of another.1 3 0 A
noncomplying party will not suffer any loss greater than that of any of
the other participants in the transaction. Thus, there is little incentive
for any party to ensure that their production is not over- or un-
derbalanced. Consequently, such a method may tend to promote
fraudulent and deceitful practices considering that all non-conformi-
ties will balance proportionately.
126. COPAS, supra note 54, at 7.
127. As used herein, "shippers" shall mean those entities owning a contractual right to trans-
port gas on a pipeline system, whether they are marketers, operators or end-users. The right to
transport gas is normally granted by the pipeline in a transportation services agreement, pooling
agreement or other contract.
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B. Swing Based On Confirmed Nominations
One party, or several parties, is/are designated to take the
"swing" 131 at a predetermined meter so as to make up for any vari-
ance between the amount nominated and the volume of gas that was
actually transported. 32 There are several advantages to this method
of nomination, namely, only parties that agree to take the swing will
have to endure the consequences. 33 All other parties involved are
assured of receiving their nominated share of the gas flow.' 34 Hence,
participants not involved in the swing will have the necessary informa-
tion to make accurate nominations prior to the fifth day of the pro-
duction month. 35
The ability to correctly nominate prior to the fifth of the month is
the greatest asset of the swing method. Many pipelines build this ap-
proach into their system by offering firm non-interruptable transpor-
tation agreements to some shippers. These parties are generally
afforded preferential treatment which insures the volumes nominated.
By contrast, a shipper with an interruptable transportation agreement
may become a "swing" shipper if operating conditions create
imbalances. 36
This method presents the potential difficulty of procuring at least
one party to function as the swing.' 3 This method is not possible
without this key player.13 8 Convincing a party to bear the entire risk
131. The "swing" is commonly referred to as the amount, frequently stated as a percentage,
above or below the average Daily Take (q.v.), which may be taken by a purchaser under the
provisions of a Gas Purchase Contract (q.v.). 8 WiLLiAMS & MEYERS, supra note 16, at 1229.
132. COPAS, supra note 54, at 37.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8B (West Supp. 1994).
136. This possibility is implicit in the statute:
Within thirty-five (35) days after the end of the month of production each first pur-
chaser or shipper of gas from a gas meter shall furnish or cause to be furnished to the
operator of the well, a volume allocation statement showing the volume of gas
purchased from or shipped for each contracted producing owner.
Id. § 570.8E. Nominations for each month are due five days prior to the commencement of
production. However, a producer will not be aware of an imbalance until weeks after that nomi-
nation is already due. For example, a producer must nominate by January 26 in order to qualify
for production in the month of February. Likewise, this same producer will have to nominate
five days prior to the beginning of March in order to qualify for production. However, the
producer will not have the February volume allocations until well after the new nominations for
March were due because the February calculations are not due for thirty-five days following the
month of production. Id. §§ 570.8D-E.
137. See COPAS, supra note 54, at 37.
138. In practical terms, the swing player(s) should neither lose nor gain in the long term.
One month may be an over-imbalance in their favor, while the next month may be an under-
balance against their interest. Eventually, these swings should balance out. However, there is
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of the transaction is not simple, for this colossal burden may prove to
be too immense for any party.139 Given the well operator's role in
Oklahoma production practices, it is foreseeable that non-operators
will assert that the operator is by law the swing producer because of its
ability to accept and confirm nominations.
C. Suspense Allocation Based On Confirmed Nominations
Measured quantities in excess of confirmed nominations are held
in a suspense account for future distribution, either for the purpose of
curing an imbalance condition or to be divided upon completion* of
the transfer contract. 4 ' Similar to the swing arrangement, the sus-
pense method also has the advantage of providing accurate nomina-
tions as long there is an excess supply within the suspense account.
However, this method is only feasible with over-produced conditions.
If the system is under-balanced, the entire method is useless and an-
other allocation method must be implemented.' 4'
D. Balancing Agreement Allocation Based On Confirmed
Nominations
This method is the basic balancing agreement used by a majority
of buyers and sellers. "All shippers are guaranteed confirmed nomi-
nations at the meter and any variance between the aggregate con-
firmed nominations and measured quantities are held between the
interconnecting parties."' 4 z Thus, individual agreements between
each buyer, seller, shipper, and transporter will allocate the risk. 43
These parties have the freedom to negotiate the risk "in or out" of a
particular contractual arrangement. Unlike the swing or suspense
methods, a balancing agreement assures that each party will eventu-
ally receive the amount of gas that had been nominated. 44
no guarantee one way or the other. Additionally, market fluctuations and contractual penalties
may play influential roles in determining whether a party would agree to the risk of acting as the
swing.
139. Cf. COPAS, supra note 54, at 37.
140. Id. at 38.
141. Id.
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E. Allocation Based On Entitlement
"This method utilizes production ownership as the basis for allo-
cation at production points with multiple ownership and/or property
specific contract commitments."'145 The primary advantage of this
method is that producers who perform accordingly will not suffer for
the noncompliance of other producers. 46 However, this allocation
method is not possible until actual volume nominations are calculated
in proportion to ownership interest.147 This necessity creates a delay
in allocating proper quantities of gas to individual parties.
In general, the majority of natural gas producers in Oklahoma are
not aware of allocation issues after the gas leaves the wellhead. As
producers are generally paid for only the amounts actually produced,
there are no penalties to the producer for nominating more than a
well is capable of producing. Since pipelines maintain the traditional
role of policing nominations and matching them with actual produc-
tion, and marketers and transporters assume those risks, producers do
not particularly care at this time about the unauthorized gas delivered
into the pipeline system. Their indifference could change as pipeline
imbalance risks become greater, more interstate pipelines divest
themselves of gathering lines, and marketers attempt to minimize
their risks.
F. Problematic Areas of Cumulative Balancing
Under the PRSA, it is unclear what remedies are available in
Oklahoma to a producer when a marketer ceases to participate fur-
ther in a long running cumulative balancing agreement. It is not clear
who is liable to "make up" the difference in damages in the case of an
underproduced well. The issue also arises as to who is liable for pen-
alties imposed by pipelines in the case of unauthorized gas deliveries,
especially if the producer was not at fault.
V. POTEmIAL ISSUES UNDER S.B. 168
A. Sales Under the UCC
Oklahoma's codification of the Uniform Commercial Code
145. Id. at 40.
146. Id.
147. This method "[c]reates the potential for delayed cash flow for all parties, since shippers
may only be willing to purchase and pay transportation expense for actual allocated quantities. If
the estimate to actual process is used, it increases administration by performing the billing and
payment cycle at least twice." Id.
1994]
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(UCC) controls a natural gas transaction because the commodity is
regarded as a fungible good.148 However, due to the limited amount
of case law concerning natural gas measurement and imbalance issues,
it is advantageous to analogize natural gas to similar commodities gov-
erned under the UCC.14 9
The general rule under the UCC is that acceptance of goods is
final.' 50 However, if acceptance was on the reasonable assumption
that the non-conformity would be seasonably cured, the buyer still has
an effective remedy.' 5' This type of acceptance is usual in a natural
gas sale since it is a well known custom in the pipeline industry for
producers and operators to balance gas the following month(s) after
the transfer. 5 2
Nonetheless, a buyer may encounter a problem with the burden
of proof in relation to the non-conformity. The burden of proof is on
148. The sale of natural gas reserves to be severed from the earth by the seller is governed by
Oklahoma's codification of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.C.C.). See Manchester Pipe-
line Corp. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 862 F.2d 1439, 1444 (10th Cir. 1988). Additionally,
Oklahoma. has explicitly stated that take-or-pay contracts are governed under the U.C.C. See
Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993) (holding that U.C.C.
§§ 2-706(1) and 2-708(1) were the measure of damages for repudiation of a take-or-pay gas
purchase contract).
149. Oklahoma also has insufficient case law concerning commodities that have imbalance
problems similar to natural gas. For this reason, other jurisdictions that have extensively dealt
with this issue are being used for analytical purposes. Cases cited within this section of the
article were selected because the commodities central to the imbalance issues all share the simi-
lar trait of volume transferability from seller to buyer.
150. See generally U.C.C. § 2-207.
151. U.C.C. § 2-607.
Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach; Burden of Establishing Breach After Accept-
ance; Notice of Claim or Litigation to Person Answerable Over.
(2) Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods accepted and if
made with knowledge of a non-conformity cannot be revoked because of it unless the
acceptance was on the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would be seasona-
bly cured but acceptance does not of itself impair any other remedy provided by this
Article for non-conformity.
U.C.C. § 2-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-con-
formity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and it
has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably in-
duced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's
assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer dis-
covers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in
condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until
the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods
involved as if he had rejected them.
152. See generally U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
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the buyer to establish any breach with respect to the goods ac-
cepted. 53 In Wayne County. Vinegar & Cider Corp. v. Schorr's Fa-
mous Pickled Products, Inc., the plaintiff was in the business of selling
and delivering vinegar to various businesses.'54 The plaintiff used
trucks equipped with tanks to deliver vinegar to defendant's place of
business where the vinegar would be pumped from the truck into a
holding vat.'5 5 Seller claimed the defendant had not paid for allegedly
delivered vinegar. On the contrary, defendant/buyer claimed that it
never received the amount stated by the seller.'5 6 Buyer attempted to
prove these calculations through the use of recorded business records,
formulas, and summary sheets. 57 However, seller rebutted buyer's
claims by proving defendant's calculations did not include leaks, over-
flows, and other transfer problems that would affect final calculations
of the amount of vinegar actually delivered. 5 8 The court concluded
that the buyer had lost his right to reject the goods pursuant to section
2-607 because the buyer had the opportunity to inspect and accept the
goods with knowledge of what had been transferred. 59
Likewise, in Bowlin's, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., Inc.,160 the court
found a two-day notice provision in the contract to be applicable in
preventing the buyer/plaintiff from succeeding in his suit based on
non-conforming goods. In Bowlin's, both buyer and seller signed a
contract that contained a notice clause requiring the buyer/plaintiff to
notify seller/defendant of any shortages in quantity within two days
after a delivery had been made.' 61 If buyer failed to comply with the
notice provision, the failure would operate as a waiver of any and all
claims.' 62 Buyer determined that there had been a shortage of gaso-
line deliveries amounting to $70,005.97.163 Seller argued that the
shortage was not reported within the specified two-day contractual
153. See Wayne County Vinegar & Cider Corp. v. Schorr's Famous Pickled Products, Inc.,
460 N.Y.S.2d. 209 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1983).
154. Id. at 211.
155. Id. at 212.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 212-13.
158. Wayne County Vinegar & Cider Corp. v. Schorr's Famous Pickled Products, Inc., 460
N.Y.S.2d. 209, 213 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1983).
159. Id. at 215.
160. 662 P.2d 661 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that contractual provision requiring retailer
to notify gasoline supplier within two days after any allegedly short delivery, where the failure of
timely notice imposed burden on any loss on retailer, was not unconscionable).
161. Id. at 663.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 662.
1994]
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provision; thus, buyer had forfeited those claims."6 Buyer countered
that the clause was unconscionable, for the provision had no reason-
able commercial purpose.165
The court ruled in favor of the seller, finding the clause to be
reasonable since inspection for shortages was able to be accomplished
within hours after gasoline deliveries were made. 66 Moreover, the
court reasoned that the two-day time frame was reasonable when con-
sidering the official comment under the state counterpart of section
55-2-607, stating that "the time of notification is to be determined by
applying commercial standards to a merchant buyer." 67 Further-
more, state law provided that "whenever... [this chapter] requires any
action to be taken within a reasonable time, any time which is not
manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.' 68 Such was the
case between the buyer and seller in Bowlin's since both parties
agreed to the two-day provision.
On the other hand, end-users of natural gas rarely use the oppor-
tunity to inspect the gas being transferred due to complicated meter-
ing systems used by all producers and pipelines. Since end-users do
not use the opportunity to inspect the gas, it could follow that their
rights under section 2-607(2)169 should not be forfeited. However, the
outcome is far from certain.
Thus, a question arises as to what is a reasonable opportunity to
inspect and, consequently, what is a reasonable time in relation to dis-
covering the non-conformity. In resolving this controversy, four fac-
tors have been used to determine what a reasonable time is in relation
to discovering a non-conformity. These factors are (1) difficulty of dis-
covering the defect, (2) terms of the contract, (3) relative perishability
of the goods, and (4) course of performance after the sale and before
the formal rejection.170
1. Difficulty In Discovering The Defect
Courts have permitted buyers to delay inspection until they are
ready to "resell or use" the goods if there is proof of custom or
164. Id. at 668.
165. Bowlin's, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., Inc., 662 P.2d 661, 663 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
166. Id. at 670.
167. Id. at 670 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANNt. § 55-2-607, cmt. 4 (Michie 1978)). New Mexico
has adopted the UCC.
168. Id. § 55-1-204(1).
169. U.C.C. § 2-607(2), see supra note 152.
170. See Bowlin's, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., Inc., 662 P.2d 661, 670-71 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
[Vol. 29:639
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trade.17 ' Natural gas industry practice dictates subsequent adjust-
ments due to the physical nature of gas and measurement difficul-
ties. 72 Furthermore, this custom is implicit within the timing
requirements of Senate Bill 168, authorizing final calculations weeks
after the month of production. 73 Following this reasoning, it is appro-
priate that end-users have the opportunity to delay inspection and
challenge for a reasonable time.74
The time delay in receiving final allocation statements prevents
parties privy to a gas pipeline contract from discovering mismeasure-
ment until these results are calculated."75 Although it is feasible for a
particular party to install their own meter on the pipeline adjacent to
the operator's meter to function as a check on the system, this proce-
dure is rarely practiced." 6 The failure to use this tool may present the
Oklahoma courts with the opportunity to decide the reasonableness of
attaching a second meter not operated by the pipeline. If the court
determines that it is reasonable to expect parties to operate their own
meters, then the most likely outcome will be a forfeiture of the reme-
dies offered under section 2-607. On the contrary, if the court finds
that inspection of the gas is not required to be reasonable, then end-
users should still have section 2-607(2) available as a remedy.'17
2. Terms Of The Contract
Section IV of this article strongly recommends agreement on a
171. See GNP Commodities, Inc. v. Walsh Heffernan Co., 420 N.E. 2d 659,665 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) (holding that commodity trader, due to trade usage, was permitted to delay inspection of
frozen pork bellies bought from public meat broker until the buyer was prepared to resell the
product).
172. See discussion supra section HI(B).
173. The section provides:
Within fifteen (15) days after the end of the month of production, each owner of a
gas meter taking gas solely from a gathering system shall provide upon first request by
the owner of such gathering system and thereafter, the gross volume of gas measured
by such meter both in MCF and British Thermal Unit equivalent.
Within twenty (20) days after the end of the month of production, each owner of
gas meter shall provide or cause to be provided in writing to the operator of the well,
the gross volume of gas measured by such meter, both in MCF and British Thermal
Unit equivalent. * * *
Within thirty-five (35) days after the end of the month of production each first
purchaser or shipper of gas from a gas meter shall furnish or cause to be furnished to
the operator of the well, a volume allocation statement showing the volume of gas
purchased from or shipped for each contracted producing owner. * * *
OKLA. STAT. ANNm. tit. 52, §§ 570.8D-E (West Supp. 1994). See also Graves, supra note 92, at
427.
174. Cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8E (West Supp. 1994).
175. Id. § 570.8.
176. Buyers and sellers have chosen to rely solely on the meter operator's calculations.
177. See supra note 151.
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measurement method prior to entering a gas contract. A majority of
spot-market sales, however, are completed with the use of a short
form contract, many of which do not contain a reference to measure-
ment. 78 Without a contractual agreement on the allocation of risk,
UCC principles should control the transaction.1 79
3. Perishability and Course of Performance
Gas that has been transferred through a pipeline cannot be re-
jected at the receiving end. It is automatically accepted into a storage
facility where the transferred gas is co-mingled with other gas or it is
immediately consumed by the burners of an end-user. Consequently,
quality and quantity issues are bound to arise. In previous years, end-
users of natural gas purchased gas directly from interstate pipelines
regulated by federal authorities, or from local distribution companies
regulated by the states' or municipalities' law. Since FERC Order No.
436, end-users have directly contracted with marketing companies or
producers to purchase gas. While regulatory agencies formerly in-
sured accurate measurement, end-users may now have to rely on spe-
cific contractual language and their own metering facilities.
Consequently, a review of U.C.C. principles is recommended when
contracting for the delivery of natural gas at an end-user facility.
B. Zero Nomination
Section H of the PRSA states that "[i]f the operator of the well is
not provided with the information set forth in subsection A and C [of
§ 570.8] within the sixty-day period set forth in each said subsection,
the operator of the well shall have the right, but not the obligation, to
confirm zero volume of gas sales for such noncomplying producing
owner. ,, .o Regardless what reason the operator bases the right to
zero nominate a producing owner upon, a question will arise whether
this practice is equitable in a situation where the producing owner is
unable to comply with the information requirements of sections A and
C through no fault of his own. There are many possible problems that
exist in transmitting correct information within the meaning of the
178. The common practice is for marketers to telephone different producers and end-users in
an attempt to negotiate the best deal. These deals are orally agreed upon, only later to be
confirmed in short-form contracts via a fax machine.
179. See generally Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 862 F.2d 1439
(10th Cir. 1988); Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 863 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1993).
180. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8H (West Supp. 1994).
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statute. For a producing owner to report in a timely fashion in accord-
ance with the PRSA, he must first receive other statements from the
operators of the system.' 8' Although the statute is worded in a man-
ner which gives broad discretion to the operator,182 it is feasible that
zero nominating a producing owner who was not at fault for non-com-
pliance with sections A and C might be an abuse of discretion. Like-
wise, complying interest owners who are affected by the operator's
generosity may view leniency as an abuse.
If the operator does zero nominate, one could argue that the non-
complying producing owner should have the right to make up the lost
volumes the following month. Alternatively, an argument can be
made that the non-complying producer has to wait until the well is dry
before balancing in accordance with the method prescribed in Beren v.
Harper Oil Co.'83 The Beren interpretation seems the more likely in-
tent of the Oklahoma Legislature because allowing the producing
owner to balance the zero nomination the following month would give
the statute no substantive meaning.
The purpose of the zero nomination clause is to penalize produ-
cers who do not comply with the information requirements of subsec-
tions A 184 and C.18 5 If the producing owner can balance the previous
month's zero nomination penalty in the following month, the penalty
is, for all intents and purposes, nullified. Thus, it follows that the pro-
ducing owner would have to wait until the well is dry before balancing
via Beren v. Harper Oil.'86
181. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8D (West Supp. 1994).
182. Id. § 570.8H ("[T]he operator of the well shall have the right, but not the obligation, to
confirm zero volume of gas sales for such noncomplying producing owner.....
183. 546 P.2d 1356 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
184. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8A (West Supp. 1994) ("[E]ach working interest owner
in a well producing gas shall furnish or cause to be furnished to the operator a written statement
showing the name, address, royalty interest, taxpayer identification number and payment status
of owners of royalty interest to which such working interest is subject.").
185. Id. § 570.8C ("[E]ach producing owner shall report and account to the operator of the
well, the identity of the first purchaser or shipper of the gas and the information specified in
Section 570.12 of this title. Within thirty (30) days after receiving notice of any retroactive gas
volume adjustment, each producing owner shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, notice of such
retroactive adjustment to the operator of the well.").
186. The court in Beren identified three preferred methods for balancing a well: (1) Balanc-
ing in kind - A balancing in volumes. In effect the under-produced party takes a certain per-
centage of the over-produced party's gas until the imbalance has been "made up." (2) Periodic
cash balancing. Here, the underproduced party receives cash, and the well is immediately
brought into balance. (3) Cash balancing upon reservoir depletion. The parties endeavor to
maintain a reservoir balance during the life of the well, and on depletion, the overproduced
party accounts to the underproduced party in cash. Beren, 546 P.2d at 1359. See also Hoefling,
supra note 24, at 73-74.
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It is conceivable, however, that the Oklahoma Legislature in-
tended to overrule the balancing right implicit in Beren. Thus, a pro-
ducer that has been zero nominated would lose that nomination
permanently. This reading is highly unlikely considering that such an
act might border on an unconstitutional taking and a violation of the
due process clause.
C. Retroactive Adjustment
Implicit within the statutory scheme governing the natural gas in-
dustry is the ability to retroactively adjust for imbalances of preceding
months. The producing owner is obligated to nominate five 5 days
prior to the month of production.'8 However, the volume calcula-
tions of that month of production do not have to be calculated until
thirty-five days following the month of production. 88 Nonetheless,
the producing owner is still obligated to nominate for the next month
five days before that production commences. 189 This obligation com-
pels the producing owner to make an educated guess for the nomina-
tion of the ensuing production month. Such conjecture is bound to be
inaccurate by some margin, thus causing an inevitable imbalance.
"Within thirty (30) days after receiving notice of any retroactive
gas volume adjustment, each owner of a gas meter shall furnish notice
of such retroactive adjustment to the operator of the well."' 9 The
statute of limitations in regard to receiving notice of the initial imbal-
ance giving rise to the retroactive adjustment, however, is not ex-
pressed within the statute. Most contracts provide for audit rights of
meters for as long as two years. Nonetheless, Oklahoma's Limitation
of Actions and the U.C.C. both hold written contracts to a five year
period.' 91 Similarly, the PRSA requires copies of information fur-
nished by the operator to be maintained for a period of not less than
five years, presumably in the event of litigation.19 A dilemma may
arise, however, as to when the statute of limitations begins to run.
Namely, does the cause of action accrue at contract formation or upon
discovery of the imbalance? Case law indicates a cash balancing at
187. OxLA. STAT. ANN.. tit. 52, § 570.8B (West Supp. 1994).
188. Id. § 570.8E.
189. Id. § 570.8B.
190. Id. § 570.8D.
191. OxLA. STAT. ANNw. tit. 12, § 95 (West 1988). See also United Crude Marketing and
Transportation Co. v. Robert Gordon Oil Co., 831 P.2d 659 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).
192. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.8G (West Supp. 1994). This clause is consistent with
both Oklahoma and UCC principles.
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the end of the productive life of a well. 9 3 However, the PRSA may
be read to preclude investigations of unknown imbalances which may
have accrued more than five years prior to the enactment of the
PRSA or more than five years prior to discovery of the imbalance.
Clearly, an issue now exists in Oklahoma law as to the ability to chal-
lenge production figures relating back more than five years. This pos-
sibility may significantly affect an underproduced owner's rights to an
accounting of all revenue attributable to the well during its productive
life.
Rather than using a contractual theory, producers may deem a
suit in negligence to be more appropriate, as in Woods Petroleum.194
The greatest incentive for filing a negligence action, as opposed to a
cause of action based on breach of contract, is the possibility of puni-
tive damages. 95 Unlike contract actions, tort claims allow for the re-
covery of these exemplary claims. 96 While the jury in Woods
Petroleum did not award punitive damages, the court would have been
within its power to recognize these damages if the jury would have
found them to be apparent.197 While Woods Petroleum is the only
case on point dealing with negligence for mismeasurement of gas, the
court was quite sympathetic to the producer considering that a res ipsa
loquitur argument was successful. 98 Similarly, it is feasible that the
court would be equally receptive to a fraud action in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The passage of the Production Revenue Standards Act by the
193. See supra note 36.
194. Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 700 P.2d 1023 (Okla. Ct. App.
1983).
195. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CoNrcrACs, § 12.8 (1982) ("[N]o matter how reprehensible
the breach, damages that are punitive, in the sense of being in excess of those required to com-
pensate the injured party for his lost expectation, are not ordinarily awarded for breach of con-
tract."). See Z.D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1975).
196. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977) ("Punitive damages are damages,
other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.").
197. See Woods Petroleum, 700 P.2d at 1028. One adverse consequence of using a tort theory
is that the statute of limitations in Oklahoma is only two years. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95
(West 1988). Alternatively, there is a five year statute of limitations for a breach of contract
action. Id. Thus, parties are not afforded the liberty of the longer statute of limitations when
attempting to take advantage of the possibility of punitive damages. It is important to note in
this regard, however, that the statute of limitations for an action on the ground of fraud is not
deemed to begin to run until the discovery of the fraud. Id. This friendly tolling of the statute of
limitations will permit producers to file fraud actions many years after the contractual limitations
have already accrued, while still preserving the right to claim punitive damages.
198. See Woods Petroleum, 700 P.2d at 1026.
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Oklahoma legislature represents a significant step towards codifying
the fights and duties of working interest owners in natural gas wells.
Section 570.8 sets forth certain notice and reporting requirements for
working interest owners, operators, and meter owners. The require-
ments are designed to insure that meaningful data is timely available
to all interested parties so that effective decision making can occur.
The Act confirms in the well operator the power to "zero nominate" a
non-complying working interest owner, thus depriving that owner of
its ability to sell its proportionate share of production. The inherent
ability, and duty, of the well operator to police the production of a
well previously recognized in Oklahoma case law has now been codi-
fied in Oklahoma.
The PRSA, however, leaves many questions unanswered. First, it
is unclear how the operator is directed to allocate nominations for gas
between working interest owners when production imbalances exist or
are accruing. Second, in the event that actual production differs form
nominated production, the statute is silent as to which working inter-
est owner bears the loss, or enjoys the gain. Finally, the statute places
a burden on the owner of the meter to confirm nominated volumes to
the operator.
Many meter owners are also interstate or intrastate pipeline com-
panies who have specific tariffs or operating procedures which may
differ from the statutory time scheme envisioned by the PRSA. By
allowing the operator to zero nominate working interest owners who
are contracted to the owner of the meter, the legislature has circum-
vented direct legislation of interstate pipelines that are regulated by
federal law. Whether the legislation proves effective in implementing
a standard notice and reporting scheme where pipelines and gathering
companies are involved remains an open question.
The PRSA also legislatively acknowledges that initial measure-
ments of natural gas volumes almost always require subsequent ad-
justments. The accurate measurement of natural gas and its heating
value, expressed in Btu's, is an area that has seen little recent legisla-
tion or regulatory attention. The nomination and confirmation of nat-
ural gas can only accrue in an environment where clear and
unambiguous measurement standards are legislatively in place. With
the advent of electronic flow meters and the concurrent regulations of
state and federal law, it is unclear if all measurement of gas in
Oklahoma is consistent.
The new framework created by the PRSA also raises interesting
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questions concerning the remedies available to affected parties. Sec-
tion 570.8J provides that remedies available under the PRSA do not
preclude any party from pursuing relief in the district courts. The sec-
tion specifically mentions the right to offset but does not elaborate on
the issue.
As noted, methodologies do exist which deal with the allocation
of risks amongst working interest owners, operators, marketers/ship-
pers and pipelines concerning the nomination, confirmation and pay-
ment for natural gas volumes. The legislature has not adopted any
particular methodology. Consequently, producers and operators
would be well advised to address these issues by private contractual
arrangements. With the advent of FERC-approved penalties for un-
authorized gas, the industry must focus on accurate and reliable mea-
surement of natural gas, the potential for litigation and the available
remedies.
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